Payment card associations offer both debit and credit cards and, until recently, engaged in a tie-in on the merchant side through the so-called honour-all-cards (HAC) rule. The HAC rule came under attack on the grounds that the credit and debit card markets are separate markets and that the...

We consider a network that intermediates traffic between free content providers and consumers. While consumers do not know the traffic cost when deciding on consumption, a content provider knows his cost but may not control the consumption. We study how pricing consumers' and content providers'...

A particular tariff option is said to be foggy when another option or a combination of other tariff options offered by the same firm is always less expensive regardless of the usage profile of any customer. Alternatively, tariff fogginess may refer to the whole set of tariff options and it is...

Miscoordination of buyers might prevent entry in an industry with an incumbent and a more efficient potential entrant. Buyers' power therefore favours entry by eliminating coordination problems. We also identify a mechanism which facilitates entry: if the potential entrant could credibly offer...

R&D incentives of new entrants to a market may be shaped by the prospects of being acquired by an incumbent. In this paper, we analyze a two-stage innovation game between one incumbent and a large number of entrants. In the first stage, firms compete to develop innovations of high quality. They...

The deregulation of the telecommunications industry has resulted in a variety of industry structures which have been created in the hope of increasing competition. One example is the licensing of cellular telephone services in the United States. In the face of scarce radio spectrum, the Federal...

Using a new data set of the telecommunications sector on privatization (1981-98 for 167 countries) and competition policies (1990-98 for roughly 50 countries), this Paper investigates the political economy determinants of privatization and liberalization in the telecommunications sector....

A few recent contributions have claimed that in high-tech industries—where innovation is often cumulative and products include many components which are protected by patents in the hands of many different patent holders—the cost of obtaining all necessary licenses is too high. Some have even...

This Paper analyses the incentives that operators have to invest in facilities with different levels of quality. A network of better quality is more expensive but may give an important edge to an operator when competing against a rival. We extend the framework of Armstrong-Laffont-Rey-Tirole by...

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges firms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay first investment....