Similar Search Results

Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

action and transparency on consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in politics, corporate … signal structure under which transparency on action is detrimental to the principal. The Paper also shows the existence of … complementarities between transparency on action and transparency on consequence. The results on the distinction between transparency on …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656470

Smooth, strategic communication

Deimen, Inga; Szalay, Dezso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where players' optimal actions depend on the realization of multiple signals but the players disagree on the relative importance of each piece of news. We characterize a statistical environment - featuring symmetric loss...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084620

Network Games with Incomplete Information

De Martí, Joan; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We consider a network game with strategic complementarities where the individual reward or the strength of interactions is only partially known by the agents. Players receive different correlated signals and they make inferences about other players' information. We demonstrate that there exists...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096094

Efficient Competition through Cheap Talk: Competing Auctions and Competitive Search without Ex Ante Price Commitment

Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We consider a frictional two-sided matching market in which one side uses public cheap-talk announcements so as to attract the other side. We show that if the first-price auction is adopted as the trading protocol, then cheap talk can be perfectly informative, and the resulting market outcome is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083306

Efficient Cheap Talk in Directed Search: On the Non-essentiality of Commitment in Market Games

Kim, Kyungmin; Kircher, Philipp - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Directed search models are market games in which each firm announces a wage commitment to attract a worker. Miscoordination among workers generates search frictions, yet in equilibrium more productive firms post more attractive wage commitments to fill their vacancies faster, which yields...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083578

Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083588

Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation

de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083847

Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information

Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Orzach, Ram; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent. We characterize the unique equilibrium in these contests, and examine the role of information in determining the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084342

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036239