Similar Search Results

Social mobility and redistributive taxation

Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We investigate redistributive taxation in a political economy experiment and determine how different patterns of social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008607502

Democratic Public Good Provision

Hassler, John; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123612

Competing on Good Politicians

Galasso, Vincenzo; Nannicini, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Is electoral competition good for political selection? To address this issue, we introduce a theoretical model in which ideological parties select candidates between party loyalists and experts, and allocate them into the electoral districts. Non-ideological voters, who care about national and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005061479

To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy

de la Croix, David; Doepke, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

The governments of nearly all countries are major providers of primary and secondary education to their citizens. In some countries, however, public schools coexist with private schools, while in others the government is the sole provider of education. In this study, we ask why different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124295

Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation

Crutzen, Benoît SY; Sahuguet, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

taxes and redistribution schemes with distortions. We show that the presence of distortions makes full taxation unattractive …We extend the discussion of redistributive politics across electoral systems to allow for taxation to be distortionary … taxation can be understood as an analysis of the trade-off between efficiency and targetability. We derive the equilibrium …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504298

Transparency Gloves for Grabbing Hands? Politics and (Mis)Governance

Blumkin, Tomer; Gradstein, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Employing the canonical political agency model, this Paper studies the incentives of the government to provide high-quality services by reducing corruption. Acting as a principal in a moral hazard framework, the public disciplines the incumbent by replacing him if the generated output is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504531

Reforming Europe's Labour Market: Political Issues

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

In this paper we study the political issues associated with reform in the European labour market. We first discuss the role played by labour market rigidities in European society, and argue that reform is a difficult task because many regulations and rigidities benefit the majority of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497719

On the Political Economy of Labour Market Flexibility

Saint-Paul, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1993

This paper starts from the observation that despite their very high levels of unemployment, major European countries have devoted few resources to reducing it. This suggests that there is little political concern about high unemployment. I develop a model where the government tries to increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498035

Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets

Anderson, Kym; Rausser, Gordon; Swinnen, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The agricultural and food sector is an ideal case for investigating the political economy of public policies. Many of the policy developments in this sector since the 1950s have been sudden and transformational, while others have been gradual but persistent. This article reviews and synthesizes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083540

Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds

Caselli, Francesco; Cunningham, Tom; Morelli, Massimo; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083735