We propose a clientele-based model of the yield curve and optimal maturity structure of government debt. Clienteles are generations of agents at different lifecycle stages in an overlapping-generations economy. An optimal maturity structure exists in the absence of distortionary taxes and...

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard in a firm subject to stochastic growth opportunities. In our model, managers are dismissed after poor performance, but also when an alternative manager is more capable of growing the firm. The optimal contract may involve managerial...

In a period of rapid integration and accelerated growth in emerging markets, three striking trends have been (1) a divergence in the private saving rates of emerging markets and advanced economies, (2) large net capital outflows from emerging markets, and (3) a sustained decline in the world...

We develop a model of the gambler's fallacy -- the mistaken belief that random sequences should exhibit systematic reversals. We show that an individual who holds this belief and observes a sequence of signals can exaggerate the magnitude of changes in an underlying state but underestimate their...

We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management. A competitive investor can invest through an index fund or an active fund run by a manager with unknown ability. Following a negative cashflow shock to assets held by the active fund, the investor...

We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices. Infinitely-lived agents can establish long positions in a search spot market, or short positions by first borrowing an asset in a search repo market. We show that short-sellers can endogenously...

We examine how liquidity and asset prices are affected by the following market imperfections: asymmetric information, participation costs, transaction costs, leverage constraints, non-competitive behavior and search. Our model has three periods: agents are identical in the first, become...

We study the joint determination of fund managers' contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes managers unwilling to deviate from the index and...

We develop a dynamic model of liquidity provision, in which hedgers can trade multiple risky assets with arbitrageurs. We compute the equilibrium in closed form when arbitrageurs' utility over consumption is logarithmic or risk-neutral with a non-negativity constraint. Liquidity is increasing in...

We develop a model of financially constrained arbitrage, and use it to study the dynamics of arbitrage capital, liquidity, and asset prices. Arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies between assets traded in segmented markets, and in doing so provide liquidity to investors. A collateral...