Entrants are typically found to be more innovative than incumbent firms. Furthermore, these innovative ideas often originate with established firms in the industry. Therefore, the established firm and the start-up firm seem to select different types of projects. We claim that this is the...

We provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entry, and exit. To ensure that there exists a computationally tractable Markov perfect equilibrium, we introduce firm heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn, privately known scrap values and...

The degree of collusiveness of a market with consumer switching costs is studied in an infinite-horizon overlapping-generations model of duopolistic competition. In contrast to previous models of switching costs, this paper assumes that firms compete for the demand for a homogeneous good by...

Using data from a large enterprise-level panel designed to address this issue, we account for enterprise performance in Russia. We link performance to four aspects of the economic environment outlined in the literature: enterprise ownership; corporate governance; market structures and competition;...

How does firm entry affect innovation incentives and productivity growth in incumbent firms? Micro-data suggests that there is heterogeneity across industries - incumbents in technologically advanced industries react positively to entry, but not in laggard industries. To explain this pattern, we...

The paper explains how a country can fall into a 'low-skill, bad-job trap', in which workers acquire insufficient training and firms provide insufficient skilled vacancies. In particular, the paper argues that in countries where a large proportion of the workforce is unskilled, firms have little...

This Paper examines competition between a dominant network and a challenging network with third-degree or perfect price-discrimination, allowing for arbitrary configurations of network externalities, as well as horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Domination in the coordination game...

We examine a Bertrand competition game between two intermediaries offering matching services between two sides of a market. Indirect network externalities arise as the probability of finding one's match with a given intermediary increase with the number of agents of the other side who use the...