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Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information

Kessler, Anke; Lülfesmann, Christoph; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The Paper studies a straightforward adverse selection problem in which an informative but imperfect signal on the agent’s type becomes public ex post. The agent is protected by limited liability, which rules out unboundedly high penalties. Analysing the consequences of the additional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666621

Team Production in Competitive Labor Markets with Adverse Selection

Kosfeld, Michael; Von Siemens, Ferdinand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Team production is a frequent feature of modern organizations. Combined with team incentives, team production can create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team’s performance and therefore on their colleagues’ productivity. We study...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084476

Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers

Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk … not only effort exertion but also risk taking behavior. The moral hazard problem with risk taking involves an incentive …-compatibility constraint on risk, which we characterize. We distinguish between one period and several periods. In the former case, under mild …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504241

Efficient Exclusion

Moen, Espen R; Riis, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In an important paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987) argue that a buyer and a seller may agree on high liquidation damages in order to extract rents from future suppliers. As this may distort future trade, it may be socially wasteful. We argue that Aghion and Bolton's analysis is incomplete in some...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497799

Exclusive Contracts and Market Power: Evidence from Ocean Shipping

Uribe, Marín; Luis, Pedro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but a relative paucity of empirical work. This Paper employs the event study methodology to examine the effect of exclusionary contracts on firm performance in the ocean shipping industry. Shipping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497855

Exclusive Quality - Why Exclusive Distribution May Benefit the TV Viewers

Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789055

On Intrabrand and Interbrand Competition: The Strategic Role of Fees and Royalties

Saggi, Kamal; Vettas, Nikolaos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067481

Endogenous Contracts Under Bargaining in Competing Vertical Chains

Milliou, Chrysovalantou; Petrakis, Emmanuel; Vettas, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We investigate the endogenous determination of contracts in competing vertical chains where upstream and downstream firms bargain first over the type of contract and then over the contract terms. Upstream firms always opt for non-linear contracts, which specify the input quantity and its total...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123524

Financial Constraints and the Costs and Benefits of Vertical Integration

Macchiavello, Rocco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Does vertical integration reduce or increase transaction costs with external investors? This paper analyzes an incomplete contracts model of vertical integration in which a seller and a buyer with no cash need to finance investments for production. The firm is modeled as a "nexus of contracts"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661896

Foreclosure with Incomplete Information

White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We investigate the robustness of the new foreclosure doctrine and its associated welfare implications to the introduction of incomplete information. In particular, we let the upstream firm’s marginal cost be private information, unknown to the downstream firms. The previous literature has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498007