Showing 1 - 10 of 712
Today’s regulatory rules, especially the easily-manipulated measures of regulatory capital, have led to costly bank … failures. We design a robust regulatory system such that (i) bank losses are credibly borne by the private sector (ii …) systemically important institutions cannot collapse suddenly; (iii) bank investment is counter-cyclical; and (iv) regulatory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083692
requirements, more so by banks with less capital, and while still providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084084
the security level for each bank in each period, we find that during the crisis, banks with higher trading expertise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196029
bank lending to examine what an optimal combination of monetary policy and regulatory capital requirements might look like … that equilibrium level of central bank policy rates should be lower than they had been prior to the crisis. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083664
capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank … social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. We consider the effect of a negative shock to the … supply of bank capital and show that optimal capital requirements should be lowered. Failure to do so would keep banks safer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084322
We analyze banks' systemic risk taking in a simple dynamic general equilibrium model. Banks collect funds from savers and make loans to firms. Banks are owned by risk-neutral bankers who provide the equity needed to comply with capital requirements. Bankers decide their (unobservable) exposure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084432
This Paper presents a dynamic model of imperfect competition in banking where banks can invest in a prudent or a gambling asset. We show that if intermediation margins are small, the banks’ franchise values will be small, and in the absence of regulation only a gambling equilibrium will exist....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067507
We analyze the cyclical effects of moving from risk-insensitive (Basel I) to risk-sensitive (Basel II) capital requirements in the context of a dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending in which banks are unable to access the equity markets every period. Banks anticipate that shocks to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666764
This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn, and a lender of last … resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a …. Moreover, when the LLR does not charge penalty rates, the bank chooses the same level of risk and a smaller liquidity buffer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791539
We analyse the implications for the pricing of bank loans of the reform of capital regulation known as Basel II. We …-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only an extremely high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792161