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Felli, Leonardo; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

of a collusive agreement a party has to incur to walk away from such a side deal. Delegation is then a simple way for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008873329

Safety Nets Within Banks

Felgenhauer, Mike; Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how banks should protect their credit departments against the external influence from potential borrowers. We analyze four mechanisms that are widespread in practice: a credit board with unanimity or simple majority, a hierarchy and an advisory system. A bank faces a trade-off between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791309

Delegation and Dynamic Incentives

Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic … effect which reduces an inefficient agent's take-the-money-and-run incentive. Although delegation entails a loss of control …, it is optimal when uncertainty about operational efficiency is large. Moreover, delegation is more effective with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083436

Delegation and Incentives

Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661941

Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries

Kessler, Anke - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

The Paper studies the relative merits of direct and representative legislation in a setting where voters are uncertain both with respect to the likely consequences of different policies and with respect to the political preferences of their fellow citizens. Under representative legislation, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791286

Optimal Information Management: Organizations versus Markets

Castanheira, Micael; Leppämäki, Mikko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

delegation, and provide novel microfoundations for the make-or-buy decision. We outline precise conditions under which giving up …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666539

Politics and Monetary Policy

Ehrmann, Michael; Fratzscher, Marcel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

How and why do politicians’ preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks? Looking at the European Central Bank, the paper shows that politicians, on average, favor significantly lower interest rates. Three factors explain the different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784739

Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets

Grout, Paul A; Jewitt, Ian; Sonderegger, Silvia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets. The model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms. We identify a number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791750

Wholesalers and Retailers in US Trade (Long Version)

Bernard, Andrew B.; Jensen, J Bradford; Redding, Stephen J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

International trade models typically assume that producers in one country trade directly with final consumers in another. In the real world, of course, trade can involve long chains of potentially independent actors who move goods through wholesale and retail distribution networks. These...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530369

The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China

Persson, Petra; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Performance-based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165652