Similar Search Results

Verified Trust: Reciprocity, Altruism and Noise in Trust Games

Brülhart, Marius; Usunier, Jean-Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

distinct and economically relevant component of individual preferences alongside selfishness and altruism. This recognition is … power of trust as a determinant of those decisions, suggesting that altruism may explain much of what ‘looks like’ trust … protocols and framing. Therefore, we propose discriminatory tests for altruism and trust that can be based on within …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788946

Preferences for Consistency

Falk, Armin; Zimmermann, Florian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

principal-agent experiment that shows that consistency is valued by others and that this value is anticipated. The second … experiment underlines the crucial role of early commitment for consistency preferences. Finally we show how preferences for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293989

Organizations, Diffused Pivotality and Immoral Outcomes

Falk, Armin; Szech, Nora - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084048

Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Heidhues, Paul; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study how website defaults affect consumer behavior in the domain of charitable giving. In a field experiment that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145453

The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661888

The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences

Fehr, Ernst; Naef, Michael; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) question the relevance of inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments claiming that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than inequity aversion. We show that these results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114463

Paying for Confidence: An Experimental Study of the Demand for Non-Instrumental Information

Eliaz, Kfir; Schotter, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents experimental evidence that when individuals are about to make a given decision under risk, they are willing to pay for information on the likelihood that this decision is ex-post optimal, even if this information will not affect their decision. Our findings suggest that this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976787

Risk Aversion in a Dynamic Asset Allocation Experiment

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Giga, Aleksandar; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment where subjects dynamically choose their portfolio allocation between a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145479

Cardiovascular Consequences of Unfair Pay

Falk, Armin; Menrath, Ingo; Siegrist, Johannes; Verde, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper investigates physiological responses to perceptions of unfair pay. In a simple principal agent experiment … experiment we record agents' heart rate variability. The latter is an indicator of stress-related impaired cardiac autonomic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144731

When warm glow burns: Motivational (mis)allocation in the non-profit sector

Aldashev, Gani; Jaimovich, Esteban; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model of an economy with the non-profit sector financed through private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non-profit sector (because of a higher income in the for-profit sector,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084421