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Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others?

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt institutions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136576

Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?

Hunt, Jennifer; Laszlo, Sonia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding when an official angles for a bribe, when a client pays, and the payoffs to the client's decision. We test this framework using a new data set on bribery of Peruvian public officials by households. The theory predicts that bribery is more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114227

Bribery in Health Care in Peru and Uganda

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In this paper, I examine the role of household income in determining who bribes and how much they bribe in health care in Peru and Uganda. I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care: doubling household consumption increases the bribery...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114349

How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504493

Information, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement

Garoupa, Nuno; Jellal, Mohamed - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

the underlying offense with a criminal sanction for corruption, both imposed on offenders. A higher criminal sanction for … the underlying offense implies that the government must spend more resources to detect and punish corruption (since the … sanction for corruption (in order to offset the negative effect on deterrence). …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124218

The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian---as opposed to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662287

Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

fraud, or corruption - that share with cartels the crucial features that well designed leniency and whistleblower programs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662235

Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment

Kugler, Maurice; Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

in corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption … organized crime to corruption, and ensuing impunity leads to higher rather than lower crime. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788890

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229

Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority. We focus on their ability to directly deter cartels and analogous criminal organizations by undermining internal trust, increasing individual incentives to ‘cheat’ on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136696