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Fiscal Centralization and the Political Process

Albornoz-Crespo, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

private sector and the support for decentralization. Since political support to centralization evolves over time, driven …We study the dynamic support for fiscal decentralization in a political agency model from the perspective of a region …. We show that corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time. However, centralization …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468714

The Political Economy of International Unions

Alesina, Alberto F; Angeloni, Ignazio; Etro, Federico - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

bias toward excessive centralization and small size of the union, however. This bias can be corrected if there is a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666614

International Unions

Alesina, Alberto F; Angeloni, Ignazio; Etro, Federico - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

processes and induce excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with non-uniform policies that reduce these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791323

What Does the European Union Do?

Alesina, Alberto F; Angeloni, Ignazio; Schuknecht, Ludger - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making role of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.), in a selected number of policy domains. Our goal is to examine the division of prerogatives between European institutions and national...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124230

Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning versus Re-election Concerns

Le Borgne, Eric; Lockwood, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between officeholder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the officeholder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792465

Democratic Public Good Provision

Hassler, John; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses an overlapping generation model of public good provision under repeated voting. The public good is financed through age-dependent taxation that distorts human capital investment. Taxes redistribute income both across different skill groups and across generations. We contrast...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123612

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134

The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India

Besley, Timothy J.; Burgess, Robin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed and politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791661

Centralized decision making against informed lobbying

Costa Lima, Rafael; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

structures that gives the policymaker additional bargaining power against lobbies. Thus, when compared to decentralization …, centralization reduces capture, and is more likely to be welfare enhancing in the presence of information asymmetries. Then, we apply …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083471

Political Budget Cycles and Fiscal Decentralization

Gonzalez, Paula; Hindriks, Jean J.G.; Lockwood, Ben; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

probability is larger under centralization (decentralization) when the rents to office are low (high). Voter welfare under the two … fiscal policy is distorted in any region (the political budget cycle, PBC) differs across fiscal regimes. With centralization … from centralization. Our results are robust to a number of changes in the specification of the model. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124313