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Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from the United States

Besley, Timothy J.; Persson, Torsten; Sturm, Daniel M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

One of the most cherished propositions in economics is that market competition by and large raises consumer welfare. But whether political competition has similarly virtuous consequences is far less discussed. This paper formulates a model to explain why political competition may enhance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792440

Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model

Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1994

This paper approaches the question of the appropriate level of decentralization of power in government as a problem in the allocation of control rights under incomplete contracts. This approach is preferable to that of the literature following the Tiebout model of local public goods, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792514

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ‘managerial power’ approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

have power to influence their own compensation, and they use their power to extract rents. As a result, executives are paid … more than is optimal for shareholders and, to camouflage the extraction of rents, executive compensation might be … practices. We conclude that extraction of rents might well play a significant role in US executive compensation; and that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage … rents can explain significant features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that have long been viewed as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272716

Federal Fiscal Constitutions. Part II: Risk Sharing and Redistribution

Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

The paper studies the political and economic determinants of inter-regional public transfers. It points to an important difference between two alternative federal fiscal constitutions. The paper shows that inter-regional transfers can be determined either by a federation-wide vote over a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504413

The Political Economy of Policy Centralization: Direct Versus Representative Democracy

Redoano, Michela; Scharf, Kimberley - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This paper analyses policy centralization outcomes in a two-jurisdiction model of public good provision choices with heterogeneous policy preferences and inter-jurisdictional policy spillovers under two alternative political procedures: direct referendum and representative democracy. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497894

Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States

Besley, Timothy J.; Case, Anne - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This Paper has three main aims. First, it reviews existing empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional rules,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498200

The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China

Persson, Petra; Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Performance-based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who rose from low to high positions within...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165652