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Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504775

Effects of religiosity on social behaviour: Experimental evidence from a representative sample of Spaniards

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espín, Antonio M.; Neuman, Shoshana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

, bargaining behaviour and sense of fairness/equality, trust, and positive reciprocity. Three dimensions of religiosity are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083371

The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences

Fehr, Ernst; Naef, Michael; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) question the relevance of inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments claiming that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than inequity aversion. We show that these results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114463

Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497798

Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control

Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

incentives as well as the puzzling incompleteness of many economic contracts. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124063

The Firm as the Locus of Social Comparisons: Internal Labor Markets versus Up-or-out

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Friebel, Guido; Lammers, Frauke - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns. A firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker’s status depends on past performance. We investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies: (i) internal labor markets, in which agents have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083868

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509464

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier; Sadzik, Tomasz; Sannikov, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477185

Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … regulation) do not affect pay. The strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and … risk aversion. If the CEO affects the volatility as well as mean of firm returns, incentives rise and are increasing in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530386

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principle-Agent Model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

-interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114195