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Burkart, Mike; Dasgupta, Amil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

for shareholders and bondholders. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084491

Back, Kerry E.; Li, Tao; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084717

Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?

Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority … shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate governance. Moreover, the presence of powerful families who control many … governance, what matters most is not the legal power granted to minority shareholders but rather the absence of conflicts of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

viewed as detrimental to shareholders. We also find that there is commonly a big difference between a state's ability to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

The Brain Gain of Corporate Boards: A Natural Experiment from China

Giannetti, Mariassunta; Liao, Guanmin; Yu, Xiaoyun - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study the impact of directors with foreign experience on firms in emerging markets. To establish causality, we use a unique dataset from China and exploit that at different times, Chinese provinces introduced policies to attract highly talented emigrants. These policies led to an exogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084604

Debt or Equity? The Role of Venture Capital in Financing the New Economy in Germany

Audretsch, David B; Lehmann, Erik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

Using a dataset of the firms listed on the Neuer Markt in Germany, this Paper demonstrates that venture backed firms differ from firms with other financial resources, especially debt. Thus, the results of this study provide evidence for the hypothesis that small and innovative firms are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504258

Does the New Economy Need New Governance? Ownership, Knowledge and Performance

Audretsch, David B; Lehmann, Erik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We study the implications of ownership and its induced incentives on firm performance in the ‘New Economy’. Instead of traditional performance we use firm survival on the stock market as the performance indicator. Using a unique data set of all 341 firms listed on the Neuer Markt, the German...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504269

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

. Third, and most importantly, making shareholders the ultimate owner of the firm provides the best possible diversification …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504292