Similar Search Results

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433

Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

Genesove, David; Mullin, Wallace P - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504565

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

Cheap Talk with Multiple Audiences: an Experimental Analysis

Battaglini, Marco; Makarov, Uliana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one … communication between the sender and the receiver in a way consistent with the theoretical predictions. Deviations from the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784698

Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?

Oechssler, Jörg; Roider, Andreas; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661953

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790

Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate From Welfare to Work

den Berg, Gerard J van; van der Klaauw, Bas; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661560

The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661888

English-Language Dominance, Literature and Welfare

Melitz, Jacques - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

translations are systematically concentrated on writings in the original language with the largest share in world sales. The model … one particular language hurts the production of literature directly, because variety of languages of origin is enriching … language to invest in their own talents. "Literature" in the paper refers to earlier production of imaginative works which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789053

Foreign Languages and Trade

Fidrmuc, Jan; Fidrmuc, Jarko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Cultural factors and especially common languages are well-known determinants of trade. By contrast, the knowledge of foreign languages was not explored in the literature so far. We combine traditional gravity models with data on fluency in the main languages used in EU and candidate countries....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791825