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Long-term Relationships: Static Gains and Dynamic Inefficiencies

Hemous, David; Olsen, Morten - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

producers can switch suppliers and start cooperation immediately with new suppliers. Every period, one supplier has the … contractible or when we preclude cooperation in long-term relationships, (ii) the rate of innovation in the cooperative equilibrium …) cooperation may reduce welfare. Next, we assume that the frontier technology diffuses slowly to suppliers (instead of after one …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201353

Regulation Games

Gilbert, Richard; Newbery, David M G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1988

We examine regulation as a repeated game between a regulator and a utility facing a Markovian sequence of demands. Sunk capital would be expropriated by a regulator concerned only with the short-run interests of consumers. There exist rate of return regulatory policies supporting efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792339

Culture, Institutions and Democratization

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Roland, Gérard - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We construct a model of revolution and transition to democracy under an individualistic and a collectivist culture. The main result is that, despite facing potentially larger collective action problems, countries with an individualistic culture are more likely to end up adopting democracy faster...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266531

Technological Foundations of Political Instability

Dagaev, Dmitry; Lamberova, Natalia; Sobolev, Anton; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

There has been a wide-spread belief that elections with a wide franchise following removal of an oppressive dictator lead to establishment of a government that is not vulnerable to mass protest. At the same time, most of the post-World War II non-constitutional exits of recently-installed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084185

Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

Konrad, Kai A.; Leininger, Wolfgang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656134

Public Action for Public Goods

Banerjee, Abhijit; Iyer, Lakshmi; Somanathan, Rohini - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662369

Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking

Rothschild, Casey; Scheuer, Florian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084719

Diamonds are Forever, Wars are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?

Guidolin, Massimo; La Ferrara, Eliana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies the relationship between civil war and private investment in a poor, resource abundant country using microeconomic data for Angola. We focus on diamond mining firms and conduct an event study on the sudden end of the conflict, marked by the death of the rebel movement leader...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067422

Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions

Claessens, Stijn; Feijen, Erik; Laeven, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that don’t around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666705

Who is the Enemy?

Epstein, Gil S; Gang, Ira - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251