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We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554231
Motivated the European debt crisis, we construct a tractable theory of sovereign debt and structural reforms under limited commitment. The government of a sovereign country which has fallen into a recession of an uncertain duration issues one-period debt and can renege on its obligations by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276380
insight to analyse the trade credit volume and the contract terms. Our analysis suggests that the most important product … characteristic for explaining trade credit volume and contract terms is the ease with which the seller’s product can be diverted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656434
This Paper studies a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662347
This paper discusses the optimal organization of sequential agency problems with contractible control actions under limited liability. In each of two stages, a risk-neutral agent can choose an unobservable effort level. A success in the first stage makes effort in the second stage more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791951
lenders, which may make lending altogether unprofitable. Second, banks can have an incentive to offer a debt contract and … additional equity contracts to intermediate debtors, which is in turn dominated by a simple debt contract, only attractive for … seek to avoid the contract with the highest chance of delivery: that contract attracts all bad entrepreneurs. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661861
We model the emergence of formal insurance institutions as equilibria under limited contract enforceability where … to exist. It also predicts where formal insurance is likely to flourish: insurance groups that hold savings become more … Ethiopian funeral insurance groups and their members to motivate and test our model. Those which hold savings and collect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096095
This paper investigates how a mandatory activation program in Denmark affects the job finding rate of unemployed workers. The activation program was introduced in an experimental setting where about half of the workers who became unemployed in the period from November 2005 to March 2006 were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504365
The single most likely way to leave the unemployment insurance (UI) register in Hungary is not by getting a job but by exhausting entitlement to benefit. Two questions follow. First, what are the implications of the cessation of UI for living standards? Second, does UI exhaustion have much...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497937
This Paper analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498018