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This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666747
This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114514
normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition and innovation policies from a welfare perspective. Third, we … approach in several ways. We reproduce the empirical finding that innovation levels are higher in markets with lower price … dynamic markets characterized by higher levels of innovation should be less competitive. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530381
Patents are a useful but imperfect reward for innovation. In sectors like pharmaceuticals, where monopoly distortions … lower prices. Innovation prizes and other non-patent rewards are becoming more prevalent in government's innovation policy … therefore can generate the right innovation incentives. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083542
We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504542
We develop general recursive methods to solve for optimal contracts in dynamic principal-agent environments with hidden states and hidden actions. In our baseline model, the principal observes nothing other than transfers. Nevertheless, optimal incentive-constrained insurance can be attained. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504731
We analyse the optimal delegation of decision rights by a uninformed principal to an informed but biased agent. When the principal cannot use message-contingent transfers, she offers the agent a set of decisions from which he can choose his preferred one. We fully characterize the optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497908
This paper studies multiple object auctions when there are two kinds of bidders: those interested in the bundle being sold (bundle bidders) and those that want one specific object only (unit bidders). The analysis has been motivated by the sale of spectrum rights in the United States.Using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498027
Should privately informed agents with diverging interests act independently or should they commit to a mechanism? This paper analyzes different communication and decision protocols when communication involves delay. It studies under which conditions agents should (i) choose their actions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498109