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Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504295

To Merge or Not To Merge: That is the Question

Corchon, Luis; Faulí-Oller, Ramon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal mergers when the regulator is not informed about the … parameters that determine social and private gains from potential mergers. We find that most of the standard tools in dominant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504319

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

Cornelli, Francesca; Li, David Daokui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

The paper studies the role of risk arbitrage in takeover contests. We show that arbitrageurs have an incentive to accumulate non-trivial stakes in a company target of a takeover. For each arbitrageur, the knowledge of his own presence (and that he will tender a positive fraction of his shares)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504384

Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share-Prices

Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices. If being an 'insider' is better …, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. We also show that mergers increasing consumers' prices, while …-competitive mergers. These results are derived in an endogenous-merger model, predicting the conditions under which mergers occur, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504698

'Be Nice, Unless it Pays to Fight': A New Theory of Price Determination with Implications for Competition Policy

Boone, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper introduces a simple extensive form pricing game. The Bertrand outcome is a Nash equilibrium outcome in this game, but it is not necessarily subgame perfect. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome features the following comparative static properties. The more similar firms are, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497960

Search Costs, Demand-Side Economies and the Incentives to Merge under Bertrand Competition

Moraga-González, José-Luis; Petrikaite, Vaiva - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

costs go up, consumer traffic from the non-merging firms to the merged ones decreases and eventually mergers become …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083482

Aggregate Oligopoly Games with Entry

Anderson, Simon P; Erkal, Nisvan; Piccinin, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We use cumulative reaction functions to compare long-run market structures in aggregative oligopoly games. We first compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games. We show strong neutrality properties across market structures. The aggregator stays the same, despite changes in the number of firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083659

The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence Using Stock Market Data

Duso, Tomaso; Neven, Damien J; Röller, Lars-Hendrik - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

164 EU merger control decisions and evaluate the anti-competitive consequences of these mergers from the reaction of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656448

Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives

Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper investigates how the formation of larger buyers affects a supplier's profits and, by doing so, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. We first identify two channels of buyer power, which allows larger buyers to obtain discounts. We subsequently examine the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661473

Predation and Mergers: Is Merger Law Counterproductive?

Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper shows that predation might help firms overcome the free riding problem of mergers by changing the … under the US failing firm defence might be strong, since it allows mergers but limits the bidding competition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661959