This Paper computes welfare-maximizing monetary and tax policy feedback rules, in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices. The government makes exogenous final good purchases, levies a proportional income tax, and issues nominal one-period bonds. A quadratic...

This Paper outlines some issues regarding the interaction of independent fiscal authorities and one central bank in the European monetary union. It points out the possibilities for coordination failures, ranging everywhere from potentially excessive deficits and free-riding problems to...

In this Paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macromodel a la Clarida Gali Gertler (1999) to a monetary union. We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation of shocks that hit the currency area. Additionally a...

This paper analyses two-way interactions between structural reform and macroeconomic policy. If structural reforms increase the flexibility of labour markets, they are likely to improve the short-run inflation-unemployment trade-off, providing an incentive for policy-makers to expand aggregate...

The paper analyses the empirical relationship between bank risk and sovereign credit risk in the euro area. Using structural VAR with daily financial markets data for 2003-13, the analysis confirms two-way causality between shocks to sovereign risk and bank risk, with the former being overall...

Repo auctions are multiunit auctions regularly used by central banks to inject liquidity into the banking sector. Banks have a fundamental need to participate because they have to satisfy reserve requirements. Superficially, repo auctions resemble treasury auctions; the format and rules are...

Identification problems arise naturally in forward-looking models when agents observe more than economists. We illustrate the problem in several macro-finance models with Taylor rules. When the shock to the rule is observed by agents but not economists, identification of the rule's parameters...

A simple test of inflation target credibility is constructed by subtracting the maximum and minimum inflation rates consistent with the inflation targets from the yields to maturity on nominal bonds. This results in a target-consistent range of real yields on nominal bonds. If expected real...

A measure of the credibility of monetary policy is the inflation risk premium embodied in nominal yields. This will be time varying and can be estimated by combining the information contained in the nominal term structure of interest rates with that in the real term structure of...

This article complements the structural New-Keynesian macro framework with a no-arbitrage affine term structure model. Whereas our methodology is general, we focus on an extended macro-model with unobservable processes for the inflation target and the natural rate of output which are filtered...