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Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
endogenous choice, groups typically vote for the reward option, even though punishment is actually more effective in sustaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368
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Appropriating the Commons - A Theoretical Explanation
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667
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Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case
Genesove, David; Mullin, Wallace P - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504565
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Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790
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Punitive Sanctions and the Transition Rate From Welfare to Work
den Berg, Gerard J van; van der Klaauw, Bas; Ours, Jan C van - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000
In The Netherlands, the average exit rate out of welfare is dramatically low. Most welfare recipients have to comply with guidelines on job search effort that are imposed by the welfare agency. If they do not, then a sanction in the form of a temporary benefit reduction can be imposed. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661560
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The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited
Brañas-Garza, Pablo; García-Muñoz, Teresa; Neuman, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661888
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The Labour Market and Corporate Structure
Acemoglu, Daron; Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
finds that higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labour …, monitoring is a type of ‘rent-seeking’ activity and the decentralized equilibrium spends excessive resources on monitoring …. Labour market regulations that reduce monitoring by pushing wages up may increase net output or reduce it only by a small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504251
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How Often Should you Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents
Ichino, Andrea; Muehlheusser, Gerd - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
This Paper shows that over monitoring a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal … monitoring too much we lose the opportunity to learn how the partner will behave when not monitored. Only by allowing the partner …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504367
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Third Party Monitoring and Golden Parachutes
Iossa, Elisabetta; Legros, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
information, either about productive activity or monitoring activity, two incentive problems must be simultaneously solved: first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504381
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Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of a Community-Based Monitoring Project in Uganda
Björkman Nyqvist, Martina; Svensson, Jakob - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
, remain open questions. This paper presents a randomized field experiment on increasing community-based monitoring. As … suggest that community monitoring can play an important role in improving service delivery when traditional top …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504630