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Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N+K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm’s exit time is independent both of K and of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656154

The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenues

Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Bidders' asymmetries are widespread in auction markets. Yet, their impact on behaviour and, ultimately, revenue and profits is still not well understood. In this Paper, I define a natural benchmark auction environment to compare any private value auction with asymmetrically distributed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667057

Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792157

What Really Matters in Auction Design

Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

, predatory, and entry deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems (we … discuss radiospectrum and football TV-rights auctions, electricity markets, and takeover battles), and the Anglo-Dutch auction … – a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions may often perform better. However, everything depends on the details …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114514

Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring

Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106

Dynamic Price Competition with Capacity Constraints and Strategic Buyers

Biglaiser, Gary; Vettas, Nikolaos - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We analyse a set of simple dynamic models where sellers are capacity constrained over the length of the model. Buyers act strategically in the market, knowing that their purchases may affect future prices. The model is examined when there are single and multiple buyers, with both linear and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067464

Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

Farrell, Joseph; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124423

Multi-object Auctions: On the Use of Combinational Bids

Branco, Fernando - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1995

This paper studies multiple object auctions when there are two kinds of bidders: those interested in the bundle being …-price auctions allows the implementation of the optimal mechanism, while a combination of first-price auctions does not. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498027

Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening

Calzolari, Giacomo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082534

License Auctions and Market Structure

Jehiel, Philippe; Moldovanu, Benny - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We analyse the interplay between license auctions and market structure in a model with several incumbents and several … illustrate some results with examples drawn from the German and UK licence auctions for 3G mobile telephony. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661756