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Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland

Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value?

Estrin, Saul; Tian, Lihui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

The role of government shareholding in corporate performance is central to an understanding of China’s newly privatized …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656424

Institutional Investors as Minority Shareholders: Do They Matter When Ownership Is Concentrated?

Hamdani, Assaf; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We shed new light on the corporate governance role of institutional investors in markets where concentrated ownership and business groups are prevalent. When companies have controlling shareholders, institutional investors, as minority shareholders, can play only a limited role in corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008554240

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hart, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyse and compare three mechanisms: (1) proxy fights (voting only); (2) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123692

The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

decisions, directors’ superior information, bargaining by management, pressures on managers to focus on the short …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124408

Local Ownership as Private Information: Evidence on the Monitoring-Liquidity Trade-Off

Gaspar, José-Miguel; Massa, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper investigates the impact of ownership patterns on the way the firm is monitored, on the liquidity of its shares, and on its stock price. Building on the literature showing that local mutual funds (funds holding geographically close firms) enjoy superior returns due to private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497985

Long Term Changes in Voting Power and Control Structure following the Unification of Dual Class Shares

Lauterbach, Beni; Yafeh, Yishay - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We follow the evolution of ownership structure in a sample of 80 Israeli companies that unified their dual-class shares in the 1990s, and compare it with a control sample of firms that maintained their dual share structure at least until 2000. Our main findings are as follows. First, controlling...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000444