Showing 1 - 10 of 657
We describe a pair of subadditivity tests that can be used to evaluate the technological feasibility of separating a vertically integrated network monopoly into a common infrastructure component and competing operating components. We implement the tests with a Generalized McFadden cost function...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067525
The property rights approach to the theory of the firm suggests that ownership structures are chosen in order to provide ex ante investment incentives, while bargaining is ex post efficient. In contrast, transaction cost economics emphasizes ex post inefficiencies. In the present paper, a party...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067623
We study the determinants of the location of sub-contracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade. We model outsourcing as an activity that requires search for a partner and relationship-specific investments that are governed by incomplete contracts. The extent of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666820
This paper examines the changing incentives for the efficient management of firms in Eastern Europe. It contrasts the internal constitution of the firm (its governance and reward structures) with the various constraints imposed on the firm's activities by external conditions in capital, labour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124125
When not every facet of a transaction can be contracted upon and transacting parties' payoffs are asymmetric, low-powered incentives for those facets of the transaction that can be contracted upon may be necessary to avoid too large a distortion in those facets that cannot be contracted upon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011184083
When today’s actions can affect tomorrow's value of an asset and when the principal does not have access to hard information, either about productive activity or monitoring activity, two incentive problems must be simultaneously solved: first, the ‘ex-ante’ moral hazard problem of inducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504381
The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation. The government maximizes total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds à la Laffont and Tirole (1993). An alternative to regulation is proposed in which firms are free...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067470
We discuss the relative merits of public and private ownership. Our starting point is the analysis of Hart, Schleifer and Vishny (HSV), who apply an incomplete contract framework to study the difference between private and public ownership. Our analysis departs from HSV’s model in two aspects....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124030
We develop a model that examines the capital structure and investment decisions of regulated firms in a setting that incorporates two key institutional features of the public utilities sector in many countries: firms are partially owned by the state and regulators are not necessarily...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009209829
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008921773