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The Winner's Curse and the Failure of the Law of Demand

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114197

Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments

Klein, Arnd Heinrich; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. A principal decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the first period. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083571

All-Pay Auctions: Implementation and Optimality

Jönsson, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084454

The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting

Morton, Rebecca; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective. While voters with higher cognitive abilities are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083707

On the Selection of Arbitrators

de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Knight, Brian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

A key issue in arbitration, which resolves disputes among parties, involves the procedure for selecting an arbitrator. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem. Our findings highlight the problems with current...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399707

Second-price common value auctions with uncertainty, private and public information: experimental evidence

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Castro, Manuel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment of second-price sealed bid auctions of a common value good with two bidders. Bidders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165658

Sequential Auctions with Capacity Constraints: an Experimental Investigation

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Otamendi, F. Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment where groups of 4 subjects constrained to obtain at most one good each, sequentially … bid for 3 goods in first and second price auctions. Subjects learn at the beginning of each auction their valuation for … the good and exit the auction once they have obtained one good. We show that, contrary to equilibrium predictions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145460

The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction

Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D; Castro, Manuel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We study in the laboratory a series of first price sealed bid auctions of a common value good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information and common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative size of these three information components. According...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468529

Properties of Scoring Auctions

Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497976

How to Win a Decision in a Confederation

Jehiel, Philippe; Thisse, Jacques-François - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent jurisdictions. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority of one of the jurisdictions through a bidding procedure among the group members. We identify the following trade-off:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661614