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Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hamdani, Assaf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
should err in favour of the arrangement that is less favourable to managers. Such an approach, we show, would make it most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656367
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Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946
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The Dog that Did Not Bark: Insider Trading and Crashes
Vigueras, Marín; Maria, José; Olivier, Jacques - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
This paper documents that at the individual stock level insiders sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666589
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Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives
Albagli, Elias; Hellwig, Christian; Tsyvinski, Aleh - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
about fundamentals to investors and managers. First, we show that the informational feedback between the firm's share price … that explicitly linking managerial compensation to share prices gives managers an incentive to manipulate the firm …'s decisions to their own benefit. The managers take advantage of shareholders by taking excessive investment risks when the market …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275969
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Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements
Acharya, Viral V; DeMarzo, Peter; Kremer, Ilan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. Because investors don’t know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily disclose immediately. We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of information by firms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364996
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Collateralisation bubbles when investors disagree about risk
Broer, Tobias; Kero, Afroditi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
Survey respondents strongly disagree about return risks and, increasingly, macroeconomic uncertainty. This may have contributed to higher asset prices through increased use of collateralisation, which allows risk-neutral investors to realise perceived gains from trade. Investors with lower risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084220
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Public and Private Learning from Prices, Strategic Substitutability and Complementarity, and Equilibrium Multiplicity
Manzano, Carolina; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payo¤s, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466347
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Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms
Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
additional payment. We show that it is easier for division managers to prove top management’s manipulations when the performance … of their own divisions is low. Earnings manipulation therefore undermines division managers’ incentives to exert effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504644
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Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms
Friebel, Guido; Guriev, Sergei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
additional payment. We show that it is easier for division managers to prove top management’s manipulations when the performance … of their own divisions is low. Earnings manipulation therefore undermines division managers’ incentives to exert effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504726
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Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?
Berg, Erlend; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Manjula, R; Rajasekhar, D - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as empirically the effect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives, but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145477