work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has …

particular, branches with more experienced managers were better able to respond to the new incentives. …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

additional payment. We show that it is easier for division managers to prove top management’s manipulations when the performance … of their own divisions is low. Earnings manipulation therefore undermines division managers’ incentives to exert effort …

additional payment. We show that it is easier for division managers to prove top management’s manipulations when the performance … of their own divisions is low. Earnings manipulation therefore undermines division managers’ incentives to exert effort …