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Agency Conflicts, Investment and Asset Pricing

Albuquerque, Rui; Wang, Neng - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

Corporations in many countries are run by controlling shareholders whose cash flow rights in the firm are substantially smaller than their control rights. This separation of ownership and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the cost of minority investors by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497980

Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades

Albuquerque, Rui; Schroth, Enrique - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premia and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004969131

Understanding the Recovery Rates on Defaulted Securities

Acharya, Viral V; Bharath, Sreedhar T; Srinivasan, Anand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We document empirically the determinants of the observed recovery rates on defaulted securities in the United States over the period 1982–1999. The recovery rates are measured using the prices of defaulted securities at the time of default and at the time of emergence from default or from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666480

Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits of Control

Albuquerque, Rui; Schroth, Enrique - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Note: A substantially revised version of this paper has been published as CEPR DP7358, "Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades." Please refer to DP7358 for the most up-to-date version. We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136458

Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers

Burkart, Mike; Raff, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful … performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In firms with weak boards, turnover (performance …-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083799

Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing?

Bruno, Valentina; Claessens, Stijn - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

For a large number of companies from different countries, we analyze how company corporate governance practices and country regulatory regimes interact in terms of company valuation. We confirm that corporate governance plays a crucial role in efficient company monitoring and shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504236

Rhineland exit?

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We argue in favour of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons, First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle between the stakeholders about the ultimate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504292

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

Cespa, Giovanni; Cestone, Giacinta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become an effective entrenchment strategy for inefficient CEOs. We thus argue that managerial turnover and firm value are increased by the institutionalization of stakeholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504332

A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Hochberg, Yael; Sapienza, Paola; Vissing-Jorgensen, Annette - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behaviour of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favour of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504338

Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

Cornelli, Francesca; Li, David Daokui - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

The paper studies the role of risk arbitrage in takeover contests. We show that arbitrageurs have an incentive to … accumulate non-trivial stakes in a company target of a takeover. For each arbitrageur, the knowledge of his own presence (and … between trading volume, takeover premium, bidder's toehold, liquidity of the shares and the probability that the takeover will …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504384