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Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer --- the seller --- follows from a non--trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer--induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854541
We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498043
In many long-term relationships, parties may be reluctant to reveal their private information in order to benefit from their informational advantage in the future. We point out that the strategic use of debt by an uninformed party induces another party to reveal private information. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661720
We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083832
We model a situation where the entrepreneur has an informational advantage during the early stages of an investment project while the venture capitalist has the informational advantage during the later stages. We examine how this evolution of informational asymmetry affects venture investment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067345
develops a theory of control as a signal of congruence, and applies it to the structure of alliances between a privately …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114475
generally leads to higher welfare if efficient risk-sharing (bank investment scale) is the dominant consideration, and is always …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024483
This paper examines how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks’ strategic behaviour in determining lending standards, lending volumes, and the aggregate allocation of credit. In a setting where banks obtain private information about their clients’ creditworthiness,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666600
We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market and to advances in information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792145
We study the functioning and possible breakdown of the interbank market in the presence of counterparty risk. We allow banks to have private information about the risk of their assets. We show how banks' asset risk affects funding liquidity in the interbank market. Several interbank market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530367