We analyse a model in which bank deposits are insured and there is an exogenous cost of bank capital. The former effect results in bank over-investment and the latter in under-investment. Regulatory capital requirements introduce investment distortions, which are a constrained optimal response...

Today’s regulatory rules, especially the easily-manipulated measures of regulatory capital, have led to costly bank failures. We design a robust regulatory system such that (i) bank losses are credibly borne by the private sector (ii) systemically important institutions cannot collapse...

An important question is whether the financial safety net reduces market discipline on bank risk taking. For countries with varying deposit insurance schemes, we find that deposit rates continue to reflect bank riskiness. Cross-country evidence suggests that explicit deposit insurance reduces...

The EU deposit insurance directive requires member states to maintain deposit insurance with a minimum insured amount of 20,000 euros. This paper reviews the rationale for international coordination of deposit insurance policies. For international externalities of deposit insurance policies to...

This Paper analyses the effects on ex ante risk-shifting incentives and ex post fiscal costs of three policies that are frequently used in dealing with banking crises, namely, forbearance from prudential regulations, extension of blanket deposit guarantees, and provision of unrestricted...

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a bank whose deposits are randomly withdrawn, and a lender of last resort (LLR) that bases its decision on supervisory information on the quality of the bank’s assets. The bank is subject to a capital requirement and chooses the liquidity...

This Paper investigates the determinants of the takeover of a foreign bank by a domestic bank whereby the former becomes a branch of the latter. Each bank is initially supervised by a national agency that cares about closure costs and deposit insurance payouts, and may decide the early closure...

This paper analyses the impact of public disclosure of banks’ risk exposure on banks’ risk taking incentives and its implications in terms of soundness of the banking system. We find that, when banks have a complete control over the volatility of their loan portfolio, public disclosure...

This paper studies the impact of competition on the determination of interest rates, and on banks’ risk taking behaviour, under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. We find that lower entry costs foster competition in deposit rates and...

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks...