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Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union

Berglöf, Erik; Burkart, Mike; Friebel, Guido; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

. Members have the same consumption benefit of reform but weak and strong members differ in their cost of exerting reform … efforts. As decisions are taken by unanimity, the reform level is determined by the weakest member. However, strong members … members into the Union) can have different effects on deepening (more reform effort). When a new member is stronger than the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504398

The Impact of Turkey's Membership on EU Voting

Baldwin, Richard; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting. The aspects that we discuss are decision-making efficiency and the distribution of power in the EU's leading decision making body the Council of Ministers. We compare two alternative Council voting rules: those accepted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792179

The Development of the Division of Power among the European Commission, the Council and the European Parliament

Laruelle, Annick; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114157

The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget

Kauppi, Heikki; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004972167

Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?

Kauppi, Heikki; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper evaluates the determination of receipts from EU budget by considering a richer institutional structure than in earlier studies. We assume that the member states have self-interested objectives in CM trying to minimize their contributions within the given framework of the EU budget...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666405

Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in an Enlarged EU

Kauppi, Heikki; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

The EU declares to provide support for the rural and poor regions of its member states. However, recent research shows that past EU budget allocations (in EU-15) can largely be explained by measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers deciding on the bulk of EU...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791324

Optimal Majority Rules and Enhanced Cooperation

Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The decision-making rules of the European Union (EU) are defined in an incomplete contract signed by 15 national governments. The design of the contract defines the set of policy issues where it applies – in decision-making rules i.e. the majority rules and the division of powers among the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504730

Choosing a Champion: Party Membership and Policy Platform

Anderson, Simon P; Meagher, Kieron J - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We introduce endogenous political parties into the Hotelling-Downs voting framework to model the selection of candidates. First, activists choose which party to join, if at all. Second, party members select a champion for the general election. Third, the electorate median voter determines the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084416

Deliberating Collective Decisions

Chan, Jimmy; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Suen, Wing; Yariv, Leeat - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196032

The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory

Battaglini, Marco; Morton, Rebecca; Palfrey, Thomas R - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter’s curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on 'pivotal voter' models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661994