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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963

Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment

Cespa, Giovanni; Cestone, Giacinta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

When stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, relations with social activists may become … to stakeholder protection even in case of managerial replacement. Our theory also explains a recent trend whereby social …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504332

Business Groups in the United States: A Revised History of Corporate Ownership, Pyramids and Regulation, 1930-1950

Kandel, Eugene; Kosenko, Konstantin; Morck, Randall; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

The extent to which business groups ever existed in the United States and, if they did exist, the reasons for their disappearance are poorly understood. In this paper we use hitherto unexplored historical sources to construct a comprehensive data set to address this issue. We find that (1)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083947

Good Monitoring, Bad Monitoring

Grinstein, Yaniv; Rossi, Stefano - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Are courts effective monitors of corporate decisions? In a controversial landmark case, the Delaware Supreme Court held directors personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties, signaling a sharp increase in Delaware’s scrutiny over corporate decisions. In our event study, low-growth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084098

Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks

Frisell, Lars; Roszbach, Kasper F.; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Recent research on central bank governance has focused mainly on their monetary policy task. As the sub-prime loan market turmoil reminded us - central banks play a crucial role in financial markets not only in setting monetary policy, but also in ensuring their soundness and stability. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656403

The Structure of Corporate ownership in Privatized Utilities

Trillas, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

concentration. When political objectives are added to the analysis, it is shown that lobbying with managers induces levels of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123598

Shareholder Value Creation in European M&As

Campa, José Manuel; Hernando, Ignacio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper looks at the value generated to shareholders by the announcement of mergers and acquisitions involving firms in the European Union over the period 1998-2000. Cumulative abnormal shareholder returns due to the announcement of a merger reflect a revision of the expected value resulting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136651

Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372