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Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Information: Some Extensions

Driffill, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1987

In several recent papers macroeconomic policy has been modelled in the context of a game of incomplete information. A central result of the work by Backus and Driffill and by Barro is that the uncertainty may provide an incentive for the government to maintain a socially efficient policy of zero...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504603

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under EMU: Credible Inflation Targets or Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic?

Levine, Paul L; Pearlman, Joseph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992

The paper emphasizes the distinction between the purely fiscal reasons for fiscal policy coordination under EMU (given a credible low-inflation policy by the ECB), and the spillover effects of an uncoordinated fiscal policy on monetary policy. The worst scenario is where an independent ECB sets...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497718

Structural Uncertainty and Central Bank Conservatism: The Ignorant Should Keep Their Eyes Shut

Rosal, Joao Mauricio; Spagat, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

expectations-augmented Phillips curve and its reputation for toughness in fighting inflation. In an environment with an unknown …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497983

Incentives and Prosocial Behaviour

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498047

The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports

Macchiavello, Rocco; Morjaria, Ameet - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation, intended as beliefs buyers hold about seller …'s reliability, in the context of the Kenyan rose export sector. A model of reputation and relational contracting is developed and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083485

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

Iossa, Elisabetta; Rey, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi-period contract, when the agent’s productivity is a stochastic function of his past productivity and investment. We show that incentives are stronger and performance is higher when the contract approaches its expiry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083903

Reputation and Entry in Procurement

Butler, Jeff; Carbone, Enrica; Conzo, Pierluigi; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. We implement a repeated procurement game with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083951

Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency

Bianchi, Francesco; Melosi, Leonardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

central bank reputation and transparency. Monetary policy alternates between periods of active inflation stabilization and … pessimistic about future monetary policy and uncertainty gradually rises. Reputation determines the speed with which agents … found to benefit from strong reputation and large flexibility in responding to inflationary shocks. Increasing transparency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084074

Information Management in Banking Crises

Shapiro, Joel; Skeie, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

A regulator resolving a bank faces two audiences: depositors, who may run if they believe the regulator will not provide capital, and banks, which may take excess risk if they believe the regulator will provide capital. When the regulator's cost of injecting capital is private information, it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084160

Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance

Morrison, Alan; White, Lucy - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Existing studies suggest that systemic crises may arise because banks either hold correlated assets, or are connected by interbank lending. This paper shows that common regulation is also a conduit for interbank contagion. One bank’s failure may undermine confidence in the banking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084273