Showing 1 - 10 of 603
An agent can choose to forego benefits from side opportunities and to instead provide benefits to the principal. In return, the principal offers rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. This model allows the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002384
We consider a financing game with costly enforcement based on Townsend (1979), but where monitoring is non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. Debt is the optimal contract. Moreover, the debt contract induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults by the borrower on the equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498123
We propose a theory by which geographic variations in the transparency of the production process explain cross-regional differences in the scale of the state, in its hierarchical structure, and in property rights over land. The key linkage between geography and these institutions, we posit, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083761
A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083847
We propose a general theory that explains the extent of the state and accounts for related institutions as byproducts of the state's extractive technology. We posit further that this extractive technology is determined by the transparency of the production technology. This theory is applied to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283392
We study interventions to restore efficient lending and investment when financial markets fail because of adverse selection. We solve a design problem where the decision to participate in a program offered by the government can be a signal for private information. We charac terize optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468692
by signalling to the agent that the principal is not worth impressing. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662241
This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences (values), material or other explicit incentives (laws) and social sanctions or rewards (norms). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals’ behaviors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371470
Evidence from psychology suggests that overconfidence is more important in North America than in Japan. The pattern is reversed for shame, an emotion that appears to play a more important role among Japanese than North Americans. We develop a model that endogenizes these differences, building on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399711
A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase the likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid to the power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. The domestic power responds by acquiescing in the creation of uncontrollable paramilitaries that commit even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504744