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Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools

Barros, Pedro Pita; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policymakers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools, as they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791805

The Deterrence Effects of U.S. Merger Policy Instruments

Clougherty, Joseph A.; Seldeslachts, Jo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We estimate the deterrence effects of U.S. merger policy instruments with respect to the composition and frequency of future merger notifications. Data from the Annual Reports by the U.S. DOJ and FTC allow industry based measures over the 1986-1999 period of the conditional probabilities for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225959

How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita; Clougherty, Joseph A.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577815

The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue

Bageri, Vasiliki; Katsoulacos, Yannis; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

In most jurisdictions, antitrust fines are based on affected commerce rather than on collusive profits, and in some others, caps on fines are introduced based on total firm sales rather than on affected commerce. We uncover a number of distortions that these policies generate, propose simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084408

Nested logit or random coefficients logit? A comparison of alternative discrete choice models of product differentiation

Grigolon, Laura; Verboven, Frank - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We start from an aggregate random coefficients nested logit (RCNL) model to provide a systematic comparison between the tractable logit and nested logit (NL) models with the computationally more complex random coefficients logit (RC) model. We first use simulated data to assess possible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009322976

Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes

Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Leniency programmes (or policies) reduce sanctions against cartel members that self-report to the Antitrust Authority … party that reports sufficient information with the fines paid by all other parties, and with finitely high fines achieve the …’ punishment; and (c) increasing the riskiness of taking part to a cartel. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136696

Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators

Barros, Pedro Luis Pita; Hoernig, Steffen; Nilssen, Tore - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

Competition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority’s resource...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789047

Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

Buccirossi, Paolo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498010

Exclusive Dealing, Entry and Mergers

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Persson, Lars - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504295

A Simple Theory of Predation

Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We propose a simple theory of predatory pricing, based on scale economies and sequential buyers (or markets). The entrant (or prey) needs to reach a critical scale to be successful. The incumbent (or predator) is ready to make losses on earlier buyers so as to deprive the prey of the scale it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004973970