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We construct a locational model of majority voting when competing parties offer special favours to interest groups. Each group's membership is heterogeneous in its affinities for the two parties. Individuals face a trade-off between party affinity and their own transfer receipts.The model is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124442
This paper uses the common agency approach to analyse the joint determination of product and labour market distortions in a small (developing) open economy. Capital owners and union members lobby the government on both tariffs and minimum wages, while other factors of production are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504496
We re-address the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policymakers are subject to capture by special interest groups. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to exert influence. We find a new...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083471
private firm. We solve analytically for the Kantian equilibrium of this lobbying game together with the majority voting … more concentrated among the top productivity individuals, their increased lobbying effort generates efficiency as well as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083884
An extensive literature has studied lobbying by special interest groups. We analyze a novel lobbying channel: lobbying … politically motivated spenders of similar magnitude, stressing the economic importance of this lobbying channel. These findings …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084332
In this Paper we extend the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a multidimensional state space and policy space. We provide a characterization of equilibria. We focus on the question of feasibility of information transmission, for large degrees of conflict of interests between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067454
We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067524
: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067583
This paper posits a formal political economy model where the principle of reciprocity in multilateral trade talks results in the gradual elimination of tariffs. Reciprocity trade talks turn each nation’s exporters into anti-protectionists at home; they lower foreign tariffs by convincing their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656336
In seeking to explain why poor countries tend to choose policies that tax agriculture relative to manufacturing while rich countries do the opposite, archetypical parameters for a poor agrarian economy and a rich industrial one are inserted in a computable general equilibrium model to simulate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656464