Similar Search Results

Alonso, Ricardo; Matouschek, Niko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We explore the optimal delegation of decision rights by a principal to a better informed but biased agent. In an infinitely repeated game a long-lived principal faces a series of short-lived agents. Every period they play a cheap talk game a la Crawford and Sobel (1982) with constant bias,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789058

Joint Production in Teams

Battaglini, Marco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791765

Excess Capacity as an Incentive Device

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Tournas, Yanni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper studies the factors determining plant size and interplant output allocation within the boundaries of a multiplant firm under conditions of demand uncertainty. It shows that asymmetric information between headquarters and individual plants is one factor determining plant size and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666478

Delegated Job Design

Hvide, Hans K; Kaplan, Todd - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by … theory for how misallocation of talent within firms may occur and to the design optimal incentive contracts. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123930

Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information

Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Orzach, Ram; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent. We characterize the unique equilibrium in these contests, and examine the role of information in determining the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084342

Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints

Inderst, Roman; Wambach, Achim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Ever since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) on competitive insurance markets under adverse selection the equilibrium-non-existence problem has been one of the major puzzles in insurance economics. We extend the original analysis by considering firms that face capacity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661929

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the laboratory and to what extent deviations from standard theory can be … agency theory is indeed useful to qualitatively predict how variations in the degree of uncertainty affect subjects' behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the … particular, we investigate settings with both exogenous and endogenous information structures. We find that theory is indeed a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080

Contract Enforcement, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth

Ottaviano, Gianmarco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

The effects of the quality of institutions on economic development and comparative advantage have been so far investigated separately. This paper proposes a theoretical framework in which trade patterns and growth rates are jointly determined by international differences in contract enforcement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498068

Incomplete Contracts and Firm Boundaries: New Directions

Dessein, Wouter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

the literature has taken since. As a central challenge, I identify the need to provide a formal theory of the firm in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083406