Robust control allows policymakers to formulate policies that guard against model misspecification. The principal tools used to solve robust control problems are state-space methods (see Hansen and Sargent, 2006, and Giordani and Söderlind, 2004). In this paper we show that the structural-form...

Inflation-targeting central banks have only imperfect knowledge about the effect of policy decisions on inflation. An important source of uncertainty is the relationship between inflation and unemployment. This Paper studies the optimal monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty about the...

We define and study transparency, credibility and reputation in a model where the central bank’s characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank,...

In this paper, we provide empirical evidence for the Spanish economy, over the period 1977-97, on whether monetary policy shocks have had different effects on real output growth depending on the state of the business cycle. To do so, we adopt an extension of Hamilton's (1989) Markov Switching...

In this Paper we analyse the link between the choice of exchange rate regime and inflationary performance in four EU accession countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Estimation of pass-through effect of exchange rate changes to CPI inflation is complemented by I(2)...

It is sometimes argued that central banks influence the private economy in the short run through controlling a specific component of high powered money, not its total amount. Using a structural VAR approach, this paper evaluates this claim empirically, in the context of the Japanese economy. It...

This Paper compares the social efficiency of monetary targeting and inflation targeting when central banks may have private information on shocks to money demand and, because of verifiability problems, the transparency solution is not feasible. Under inflation targeting and monetary targeting,...

The so-called P* model is frequently used or referred to in discussions of monetary targeting. This gives the impression that the P* model might provide some rationale for monetary targeting or for the monetary reference value used by the Eurosystem. The P* model implies that inflation is...

One test of an exchange-rate peg is to ask whether the implicit inflation target of the pegging country is the same as that of the anchor country. If the inflation targets of the two countries are different, the peg's long-run credibility should be rejected. We examine the Austrian experience...

My lessons from six years of practical policy-making include (1) being clear about and not deviating from the mandate of flexible inflation targeting (price stability and the highest sustainable employment), including keeping average inflation over a longer period on target; (2) not adding...