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Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets

Grout, Paul A; Jewitt, Ian; Sonderegger, Silvia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets. The model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms. We identify a number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791750

Preventing Collusion through Discretion

Felli, Leonardo; Hortala-Vallve, Rafael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

Large public bureaucracies are commonly regarded as less efficient than modern private corporations. This paper explores how the degree of discretionary power might account for this difference in efficiency. Indeed, increasing the discretionary power of the intermediate layers of an organization...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008873329

Adversarial and Inquisitorial Procedures in Arbitration

Shin, Hyun Song - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

Should arbitrators adjudicate on the basis of their own investigations, or invite the interested parties to make their cases and decide on the basis of the information so gathered? I call the former the inquisitorial procedure in arbitration and the latter the adversarial procedure. I conduct a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504638

Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem

Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504573

Optimal Debt Contracts under Costly Enforcement

Hvide, Hans K; Leite, Tore - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

We consider a financing game with costly enforcement based on Townsend (1979), but where monitoring is non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. Debt is the optimal contract. Moreover, the debt contract induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults by the borrower on the equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498123

Insurance companies of the poor

Bold, Tessa; Dercon, Stefan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We model the emergence of formal insurance institutions as equilibria under limited contract enforceability where groups are required to be coalition-proof but also can use fines for enforcement. The model can generate coexistence of formal and informal groups without requiring heterogeneity in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096095

Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments

Klein, Arnd Heinrich; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

This paper analyzes two-stage rank-order tournaments. A principal decides (i) how to spread prize money across the two periods, (ii) how to weigh performance in the two periods when awarding the second period prize, and (iii) whether to reveal performance after the first period. The information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083571

The Dark Side of the Vote: Biased Voters, Social Information, and Information Aggregation Through Majority Voting

Morton, Rebecca; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean-Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083707

Geography, Transparency and Institutions

Mayshar, Joram; Moav, Omer; Neeman, Zvika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We propose a theory by which geographic variations in the transparency of the production process explain cross … theory to explain institutional differences between ancient Egypt and ancient Upper and Lower Mesopotamia. We also discuss … the relevance of our theory to analyses of the deep rooted factors affecting economic development and the growth of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083761

Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation

de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083847