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In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124002
This Paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791797
In this Paper we provide a strategic explanation for the spontaneous convergence of legal rules, which nevertheless falls short of harmonization across jurisdictions. We identify a free-riding problem and discuss its implications for legal culture, integration, and harmonization. It is argued...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661734
In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667
find a large and positive effect of endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to … exogenously implemented institutions. This suggests that democratic participation rights enhance cooperation in groups. With … high levels of cooperation. Our results are evaluated against the predictions of social preference models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368
in these models. We propose a way to take these pay-offs into account, and find that cooperation as equilibrium of the … parameter space, all cooperation equilibria are strictly risk dominated in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). We derive an … others defect, and argue it is a better measure for the ‘likelihood’ of cooperation than the critical level at which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666887
In this paper we characterize a situation in which non-calculative trust has to play a role in the decision to cooperate. We then analyse the given situation in game theoretical terms and distinguish those aspects of players’ decisions that are cooperative from those that may be interpreted as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792217
This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083407
We use randomized program offers and multiple follow-up survey waves to examine the effects of entrepreneurship training on a broad set of outcomes. Training increases short run business ownership and employment, but there is no evidence of broader or longer run effects. We also test whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084448
We survey the literature on social networks by putting together the economics, sociological and physics/applied mathematics approaches, showing their similarities and differences. We expose, in particular, the two main ways of modeling network formation. While the physics/applied mathematics...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557014