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Contractual Execution, Strategic Incompleteness and Venture Capital

Dessí, Roberta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Contractual execution generates hard information, available to the contracting parties, even when contracts are secretly executed. Building on this simple observation, the paper shows that incomplete contracts can be preferred to complete contracts. This is because (i) execution of incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976792

Venture Capital and Knowledge Transfer

Dessí, Roberta; Yin, Nina - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper explores a new role for venture capitalists, as knowledge intermediaries. A venture capital investor can communicate valuable knowledge to an entrepreneur, facilitating innovation. The venture capitalist can also communicate the entrepreneur's innovative knowledge to other portfolio...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168896

Delegation and Dynamic Incentives

Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball effect, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083436

Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts

Dessí, Roberta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered, benefiting from localized spillovers: Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example. There is also substantial geographical variation in venture capital contracts: California contracts are more 'incomplete'. This paper explores the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084393

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … are reflected by the behavior of subjects in the laboratory and to what extent deviations from standard theory can be … agency theory is indeed useful to qualitatively predict how variations in the degree of uncertainty affect subjects' behavior …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

A central insight of agency theory is that when a principal offers a contract to a privately informed agent, the … particular, we investigate settings with both exogenous and endogenous information structures. We find that theory is indeed a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Weddings with Uncertain Prospects - Mergers under Asymmetric Information

Borek, Thomas; Bühler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

equilibria of merger games with simultaneous and sequential moves. The application of our framework to specific oligopoly models …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788984

Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

We reconsider the property rights approach to the theory of the firm based on incomplete contracts. We explore the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083975

Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization

Ponzetto, Giacomo AM - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

I provide a justification of intellectual property rights as a source of static efficiency gains in manufacturing, rather than dynamic benefits from greater innovation. I develop a property-rights model of a supply relationship with two dimensions of non- contractible investment. In equilibrium,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084191