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Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion

Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple … collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a … strategies, this initial burst of collusion rapidly collapses. When unlimited pre-game communication is allowed via a chat window …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586

Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring

Bigoni, Maria; Potters, Jan; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084106

Price Wars in Finite Sequential Move Price Competition

Wallner, Klaus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper characterises the unique Markov equilibrium in the sequential move, finite horizon pricing duopoly with discounting. Simple, short cycles repeat until the last two periods. For discount factors above 0.75488, there are three-period reaction function cycles and below 0.75488,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504324

Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976790

The Insiders' Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation

Lindqvist, Tobias; Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper tests the insiders’ dilemma hypothesis in a laboratory experiment. The insiders’ dilemma means that a profitable merger does not occur, because it is even more profitable for each firm to unilaterally stand as an outsider (Stigler, 1950; Kamien and Zang, 1990 and 1993). The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789098

Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable 'grim trigger strategies' available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497875

Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. Both positive and negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498161

TV Wars: Exclusive Content and Platform Competition in Pay TV

Weeds, Helen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

The paper examines incentives for exclusive distribution of premium television content such as live sports and Hollywood movies. Static analysis shows that a pay TV operator with premium content always chooses to supply its retail rival, using per-subscriber fees to soften competition....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084070

Can the Failing Firm Defense Rule be Counterproductive?

Vasconcelos, Helder - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper studies the role of the failing firm defense (FFD) concept in merger control in a Cournot setting where: (i) endogenous mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains; and (ii) mergers must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority which might require partial divestiture for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084654

Dynamic Merger Review

Nocke, Volker; Whinston, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656370