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Centralized decision making against informed lobbying

Costa Lima, Rafael; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We re-address the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policymakers are subject to capture by special interest groups. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to exert influence. We find a new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083471

How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods?

Karlan, Dean S.; List, John - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

-scale natural field experiments. In the first experiment, a charity focusing on poverty reduction solicited donations from prior … the second field experiment, the same charity sent direct mail solicitations to individuals who had not previously donated … than not identifying the name of the matching donor. The first experiment demonstrates that the matching grant condition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084090

Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084108

Network Structure and Strategic Investments: An Experimental Analysis

Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

This paper analyzes the effects of network positions and individual risk attitudes on individuals' strategic decisions … in an experiment where actions are strategic substitutes. The game theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of … factors, such as the number of (direct) neighbors, local clustering and individuals' risk attitudes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136539

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

report about an experiment with 508 participants designed to test whether this fundamental trade-off is actually relevant. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080

Choosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations

Haigner, Stefan; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We analyse an experimental public goods game in which group members can endogenously determine whether they want to supplement a standard voluntary contribution mechanism with the possibility of rewarding or punishing other group members. We find a large and positive effect of endogenous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114368

On Public Opinion Polls and Voters' Turnout

Klor, Esteban F; Winter, Eyal - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661831

Incentives and Prosocial Behaviour

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We build a theory of prosocial behaviour that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this ‘overjustification...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498047

Education, Distributive Justice and Adverse Selection

Fleurbaey, Marc; Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Maguain, Denis - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We consider a model of education planning in an economy in which agents differ in their costs of acquiring education. The agents' cost parameter, called "talent," is not observed. The Principal is endowed with a fixed sum of money, with which two types of transfer can be made: in cash and in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498131