whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of …

. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single … objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling. …

, sufficiently high (but still binding) bid caps do not change the players' expected total effort compared to the benchmark auction …

valuations. We show that the experimental evidence can be explained by a simple extension of the standard auction model, where …

If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first …-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction … than in an ascending auction. …

independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time. We analyze the first-price auction … disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In … equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation …