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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Bénabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of … compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most … perfect competition, the resulting efficiency loss can be larger than that imposed by a single firm or principal, who distorts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083769

Heterogeneity in R&D Cooperation Strategies

Belderbos, Rene; Carree, Martin A; Diederen, Bert; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We explore heterogeneities in the determinants of innovating firms’ decisions to engage in R&D cooperation, differentiating between three types of cooperation partners: suppliers and customers (vertical cooperation), competitors (horizontal cooperation), and universities and research...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789217

Innovation and Competitive Pressure

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

I analyse the effects of competition on R&D effort (in a non-tournament context) and obtain robust results that hold … either price or quantity competition. The approach encompasses models of direct investment to reduce costs as well as models …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791300

The Generalized War of Attrition

Bulow, Jeremy I.; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

We generalize the War of Attrition model to allow for N+K firms competing for N prizes. Two special cases are of particular interest. First, if firms continue to pay their full costs after dropping out (as in a standard-setting context), each firm’s exit time is independent both of K and of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656154

Weddings with Uncertain Prospects - Mergers under Asymmetric Information

Borek, Thomas; Bühler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We provide a framework for analysing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types. We introduce the concepts of essentially monotone decreasing (EMD) and increasing (EMI) functions, which generalize the respective mono-tonicity properties. If the profit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788984

Strategic Supply Function Competition with Private Information

Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

losses is 1/n<sup>2</sup>. The results extend to demand schedule competition and a range of applications in product and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789071

Allocative and Productive Efficiency in REE with Asymmetric Information

Messner, Simon; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

We characterize the divergence between in informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect o incentive efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791369

To Reveal or Not to Reveal - The Case of Research Joint Ventures with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Rosenkranz, Stephanie - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

-cooperation is always an equilibrium. If competition is in a second-price auction with positive minimum R&D requirements this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504335

A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade

Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

When agents hold non-common priors over an unverifiable state of nature which affects the outcome of their future actions, they have an incentive to bet on the outcome. We pose the following question: what are the limits on the agents' ability to realize gains from speculative bets when their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067531

Informational Externalities, Herding and Incentives

Bru, Lluís; Vives, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

A version of the herding prediction model with a rational expectations flavor is reexamined in the light of incentive theory. The welfare loss at the market solution with respect to the incentive efficient solution can be decomposed into an information externality term minus an incentive cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661971