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To Charge or Not to Charge: Evidence from a Health Products Experiment in Uganda
Fischer, Greg; Karlan, Dean S.; McConnell, Margaret; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
comparison effect, decrease subsequent demand. This tension is particularly important for the distribution of health products in … Northern Uganda in which three health products differing in their scope for learning were initially offered either for free or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083717
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Expanding the Welfare System: A Proposal for Reform
Orszag, Mike; Snower, Dennis J. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997
account (covering education and training), and a health account (covering insurance against sickness and disability). Unlike …, cushioning people against economic risk, ensuring efficient provision of health and education services, providing social safety …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661484
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Investments in Pharmaceuticals Before and After TRIPS
Kyle, Margaret K; McGahan, Anita M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
This paper addresses the relationship between patent protection and investment in the development of new pharmaceutical treatments. The TRIPS Agreement, which specifies minimum levels of intellectual property protection for countries in the World Trade Organization, has increased levels of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002387
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Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?
Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083449
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Private, social and self-insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help: A political economy analysis
De Donder, Philippe; Pestieau, Pierre - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083512
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Basic versus supplementary health insurance: the role of cost effectiveness and prevalence
Boone, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
effectiveness and prevalence are important if the government wants to maximize the health gain that it gets from its health budget …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083797
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Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection
Boone, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084307
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Does the market choose optimal health insurance coverage?
Boone, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Consumers, when buying health insurance, do not know the exact value of each treatment that they buy coverage for. This … government can stimulate R&D in breakthrough treatments by excluding treatments with low value added from health insurance … coverage. If the country is rich enough such a government intervention in a private health insurance market raises welfare. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084438
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Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information
Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We study a monopoly insurance model with endogenous information acquisition. Through a continuous effort choice, consumers can determine the precision of a privately observed signal that is informative about their accident risk. The equilibrium effort is, depending on parameter values, either...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084544
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A Green Light for Environment, or a Green Light for Protection? The EU-US Dispute Over US Corporate Average Fuel Economy Regulations
Francois, Joseph; Nordström, Håkan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996
The US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulation mandates, subject to a civil penalty, producers to achieve a certain fleet average fuel economy on sales of new passenger cars. Analysing the incentive effects of CAFE, we find that it affords differential tax treatment to car models with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504591