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Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay

Auriol, Emmanuelle; Flochel, Thomas; Straub, Stéphane - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008865969

Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking

Rothschild, Casey; Scheuer, Florian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084719

Diamonds are Forever, Wars are Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?

Guidolin, Massimo; La Ferrara, Eliana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

This Paper studies the relationship between civil war and private investment in a poor, resource abundant country using microeconomic data for Angola. We focus on diamond mining firms and conduct an event study on the sudden end of the conflict, marked by the death of the rebel movement leader...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067422

Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions

Claessens, Stijn; Feijen, Erik; Laeven, Luc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that don’t around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666705

Who is the Enemy?

Epstein, Gil S; Gang, Ira - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in a common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791251

The Rise and Fall of Elites: A Theory of Economic Development and Social Polarization in Rent-seeking Societies

Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

This paper analyses how political institutions, wealth distribution and economic activities affect each other during the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive sectors (modern and traditional) is presented. Political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124016

Political Activism, Trust, and Coordination

Battaglini, Marco; Bénabou, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

maker does not react unless all of them are actively lobbying. In a ‘mutual discipline’ or high-trust equilibrium, by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792452

Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation

Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policy-maker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truth telling, we show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792547

On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control

Heidhues, Paul; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067524

Rent Seeking/Corruption And Growth: A Simple Model

Angeletos, George-Marios; Kollintzas, Tryphon - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

The goal of this paper is to propose a simple paradigm for understanding rent seeking and corruption in the growth … crime; industrial espionage; lobbying and policy influence; misgovernance, institutional inefficiency, tax evasion, etc. The … economy is shown to fall into a trap of high rent seeking/corruption and low growth. Agents' perceptions about the external …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114275