This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...

Voucher privatization programmes have been criticized for leading to excessively dispersed ownership and hence failure of control and insufficient corporate governance. We analyse the results of the five auction rounds of the Czech privatization programme and subsequent stock market...

We argue that the choice of corporate governance by a firm affects and is affected by the choice of governance by other firms. Firms with weaker governance give higher payoffs to their management to incentivize them. This forces firms with good governance to also pay their management more than...

This Paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis that combines three elements – multiple equilibria, investment collapse, and moral hazard – in a single simple account. We locate the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly-geared financial institutions, and implicit...

This paper presents a multiple-equilibrium model of the Asian financial crisis. The economy has Krugman-style over-investment caused by weak financial regulation and exacerbated by government guarantees. Following Dooley, the government only has a limited capacity or willingness to honour such...

Using a dataset of the firms listed on the Neuer Markt in Germany, this Paper demonstrates that venture backed firms differ from firms with other financial resources, especially debt. Thus, the results of this study provide evidence for the hypothesis that small and innovative firms are more...