Similar Search Results

Does Europe have an innovation policy? The case of EU economic law

Battaglia, Lauren; Larouche, Pierre; Negrinotti, Matteo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

pharmaceuticals, specifically drug reformulation regulatory gaming. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009205060

Impacts of Patent Expiry and Regulatory Policies on Daily Cost of Pharmaceutical Treatments: OECD Countries, 2004-2010

Berndt, Ernst R; Dubois, Pierre - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

report cross-country comparisons that: (i) focus on 11 therapeutic classes experiencing patent expiration and loss of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083891

Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How do Quality Differences Shape Advertising Strategies?

de Frutos, Maria-Angeles; Ornaghi, Carmine; Siotis, Georges - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We present a Hotelling model of price and advertising competition between prescription drugs that differ in quality/side e¤ects. Advertising results in the endogenous formation of two consumer groups: brand loyal and non-brand loyal ones. We show that advertising strategies are strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008680762

Investments in Pharmaceuticals Before and After TRIPS

Kyle, Margaret K; McGahan, Anita M - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper addresses the relationship between patent protection and investment in the development of new pharmaceutical … Trade Organization, has increased levels of patent protection around the world. Since patents also have the potential to … patent laws and the severity of disease, we test the hypothesis that increased patent protection results in greater drug …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002387

Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case

Genesove, David; Mullin, Wallace P - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar-refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output. Prices were increased by homogenizing business practices to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504565

Investments and Network Competition

Cambini, Carlo; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper analyses the incentives that operators have to invest in facilities with different levels of quality. A network of better quality is more expensive but may give an important edge to an operator when competing against a rival. We extend the framework of Armstrong-Laffont-Rey-Tirole by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504675

Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share-Prices

Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices. If being an 'insider' is better than being an 'outsider', firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. The stock-value is increased, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. We also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504698

Network Competition and Entry Deterrence

Calzada, Joan; Valletti, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

We develop a model of logit demand that extends to a multi-firm industry the traditional duopoly framework of network competition with access charges. Firstly, we show that, when incumbents do not face the threat of entry and compete in prices, they inefficiently establish the reciprocal access...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504712

Should Mergers Be Controlled?

Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

Anti-competitive mergers benefit competitors more than the merging firms. We show that such externalities reduce firms' incentives to merge (a hold-up mechanism). Firms delay merger proposals, thereby foregoing valuable profits and hoping other firms will merge instead - a war of attrition. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788894

Does Microsoft Stifle Innovation? Dominant Firms, Imitation and R&D Incentives

Cabral, Luís M B; Polak, Ben - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We provide a simple framework to analyse the effect of firm dominance on incentives for R&D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival firm's incentives for R&D. These changes influence the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789049