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Cespa, Giovanni - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Similarly to a durable goods monopolist, a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067575

The Dog that Did Not Bark: Insider Trading and Crashes

Vigueras, Marín; Maria, José; Olivier, Jacques - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper documents that at the individual stock level insiders sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666589

Front-running by Mutual Fund Managers: It ain't that Bad

Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Moresi, Serge X - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a situation in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading is endogenized. Noise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123513

Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control

Bodnaruk, Andriy; Massa, Massimo; Simonov, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

We study holdings in M&A targets by financial conglomerates which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M&A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123703

The Market for Protection and the Origin of the State

Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

-profit entrepreneurs: kings, lords, or mafia dons. Though self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems of long …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504400

How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down

Hunt, Jennifer - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Using cross-country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non-victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504493

Pension Fund Governance and the Choice Between Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans

Besley, Timothy J.; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Recent events in several countries have underscored the importance of good governance in private occupational pension …. Under complete contracting, governance can be shown to be neutral: DC and DB plans differ only on risk allocation. If …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497828

The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France

Bignon, Vincent; Flandreau, Marc - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083663

Blockholders and Corporate Governance

Edmans, Alex - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a … governance by extracting private benefits of control or pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization. I highlight the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084247

Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence

Campante, Filipe; Do, Quoc-Anh; Guimarães, Bernardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Motivated by a novel stylized fact -- countries with isolated capital cities display worse quality of governance -- we … ways: broader power sharing (associated with better governance) means that any rents have to be shared more broadly, hence … capital city allows the elite to appropriate a larger share of output, so the costs of better governance for the elite, in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084326